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ABSTRACT
The choice of management structure is growing in importance for hotel owners. Most owners’
investment theses are based on an attractive acquisition basis, focusing on net cash flow and the
sales exit. Depending on the market, transaction price may be influenced by asset level
performance which is highly influenced by daily revenue and expense decisions. Hotel brands
quantify their value via measures that include market share and loyalty of a customer base. While
much research has been conducted on the impact of brands on market value, the influence of
hotel management on resale value has not been well investigated. This study seeks to ascertain
whether management companies that have a larger reach also have a proportional impact on the
sales price, enjoying the economy of scale. The current study isolated the value of a brand to
identify the impact of the size of the management company on hotel sales price. Transaction data
included U.S. hotel sales over a 19-year timeframe (2001-2019). The impact of management size
on hotel sales value is investigated by answering: (1) if there is an economies of scale effect
between management size and sale price, (2) if the size of the hotel influences the impact of
management, and (3) if such effect differs by location. The results point to a relationship
between management size and hotel sales price, which varies by geography and property size.
The findings will enable hotel owners to consider an additional investment variable when buying
or selling hotels.
Keywords: Hotel Management, Real Estate Investment, Commercial Real Estate
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Overview
The Real Estate (RE) investment market includes many asset classes. Higher risk RE
asset categories are those that historically exhibit increased performance impact due to market
volatility, wherein subject knowledge is required to operate at, or above, average market
profitability (Newell & Seabrook, 2006). This research focuses on hotels as a higher-risk asset
class. Specific focus is given to the relationship between a management company’s size and
transaction price impact.
Hotels are often described as an operating business given their quick reaction to customer
and market trends as well as their need to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Unlike
other real estate asset classes, asset valuation does not depend on monthly rent collections and
vacancy factors (Worsley, 2015); rather, it is affected by daily market demand fluctuation and
expense management (Dick, 2019). The main revenue source for hotels is rooms rental revenue,
traditionally followed by food and beverage sales and, “other” revenues which encompass
parking, commissions, resort fees, etc.
A typical hotel property has many stakeholders affecting its performance but,
contractually, there are four main forces driving decision making: (1) the owner, (2) the
management company, (3) the franchisor (often referred to as the brand), and (4) the Hotel Asset
Manager, a third party who represents an owner in an owner-operator relationship. A hotel owner
is defined as any person, company, or equity investor possessing the registered right to the
physical real estate comprising the building, its grounds, or having the rights to such real estate
via a lease, land lease, or other arrangement. The franchisor is described as delivering added
brand value that is intangible in nature but which provides an important influence on the buying
1

consideration of the consumer (Carvell et al., 2016; Chernatony & McDonald, 1998). Aaker
(1991) was first to coin the term brand equity, arguing that it helps a product differentiate in the
marketplace and decrease competition; hence, allowing for charge premium. Finally, the
management company is hired by the owner under the structure of a management agreement to
manage the hotel on its behalf (Hodari et al., 2017). Hotel valuation is often a more complicated
exercise than other property types because of the greater risk of daily revenue management and
high fixed costs associated with running the business which can quickly turn a profitable
investment into a loss (Fu et al., 2013). Fu et al. (2013) also established that, unlike other
property types, hotel asset valuation often uses discounted cash flow models rather than sales
comparison or replacement methodologies because brand and management influence the
operation. Also, because of the fixed cost of operating and keeping a hotel open, the impact of
sufficient cash flow on income has overwhelming effects on value. Ultimately, this is explained
as an argument of income and expense. In other property types, an owner may charge a triplenet-lease and defray all costs to tenants. However, when it comes to hotels, every additional
dollar in revenue and expense flows to the bottom affecting the property value.
The objective of this research was to investigate whether management size impacts hotel
sales prices. Creating a management company is not an easy feat and requires accessibility to
systems, best practices, human capital, and negotiating power amongst many other capabilities to
effectively compete in today’s market. The theoretical model used is that of economies and
diseconomies of scale. The literature describes scale as somewhat of a reverse U-shape effect,
described as economies of scale (Chandler & Hikino, 2009; Jain & Robinson, 2020; Wicker et
al., 2014) and diseconomies of scale (Bolton & Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000; Stein, 2002;
Williamson, 1975) that is not exponential to growth, initially rising at a faster pace, then tapering
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which may drag a company’s productivity downwards after a certain degree of complexity. In
hotels, this may implicate an initial value increase as management size increases, then a level of
optimization in size, followed by a decrease in associated premium when management
companies increase too much value that diminishes with every additional hotel under
management. Therefore, this research addressed the size of the management company as a
potential factor of the success of the owner in selling the asset. To test the relationship between
management company size and sales price, the research examined three suppositions: (1) if there
is an economy of scale effect between management size and sale price, (2) if the size of the hotel
influences the impact of management, and (3) if such effect differs by location. Previous research
has evaded the separation of management effects from brand effects. This study fills such void
by focusing on management and testing the impact by market dynamic.
Problem Addressed
Most owners’ investment plans are based on a combination of an attractive basis,
focusing on net operating cash flow and the sales exit, which ideally occur when the hotel is sold
at a premium to acquisition. Unless an investor is looking to buy a stabilized asset (a hotel
performing at a mature stage at or above market benchmark), a common model of ‘value-add’
hotel investors is to buy a hotel and make capital investments and management changes to
effectuate an improved product, service, and operating profit. The question is how much the
management change increases the value of the property.
Hotel properties are sensitive to the daily market rate fluctuations and they are exposed to
high fixed expense overhead unlike other property types that charge monthly rent. Thus, the risk
profile associated with hotels are often described as alternative investments and the market
valuation heavily relies on the future discounted cash flow models (Fu et al., 2013) rather than
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sales comparison or cost approach. Specifically, valuation is then derived from a multiple
(1/capitalization rate) of a discounted annual forecast of net operating income (Das, 2015; Dick,
2019; O’Neill & Matilda, 2007).
Given management’s strong influence on profitability via daily revenue management and
expense controls, the current study was carried out to understand the relationship between the
size of the management company and the resale value of a hotel under the framework of
economies of scale. On one hand, the literature revealed there is a plethora of research that links
the value of a brand to resale value (Chandler et al., 2009; Jain & Robinson, 2018), in which
brand value is measured by using calculation to account for elements that are influenced by
management; hence, the term brand and management are used synonymously at times which can
potentially misrepresent cause and effect. On the other hand, and according to my current
knowledge, the assumed effect of a contractual relationship with hotel management and its
ability to drive profitability, and the subsequent impact on resale value, has been examined only
in a single research study (Hodari et al., 2017). Hodari et al. (2017) examined the market myth
that hotels that are unencumbered of management sell for a premium to properties that are
contractually obligated via a management agreement or a lease. This hypothesis challenging that
market myth was based on transactions that happened in 2006, where ownership decided to
encumber hotels before marketing them for sale. Their study of 442 U.K. hotels controlled for
the size of the hotel, branding, and chain segment (e.g., economy, midscale, upscale, luxury, all
suites), as well as other physical characteristics, location, and year of sale to determine the
relationship between variables and their value as the elements of a Hedonic pricing model. The
findings revealed that hotels in the U.K. that were subjected to a management agreement sold for
a premium of 17.9%, and those subjected to a lease agreement sold for a premium of 15.6%. For
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leased hotels, the authors explained that the stability of cashflow enabled investors to assign a
risk reduction premium on sales price over unencumbered hotels. Hotels under management
contracts achieved the mentioned 15.6% over unencumbered hotels, explained by the assumption
that contractual terms were attractive comparative to the U.K. market which is mainly lease
focused. Their recommendations for further research highlighted a somewhat basic way that
management is examined and suggested to subcategorize third-party and branded management
companies to understand impact on hotel market values. As a matter of practice, hotel lease
structures are not common in the U.S. In addition, legal employment and insurance requirements
in the U.S. effectively encumber every hotel with a management agreement, even if it is
effectively owner managed, or if such management agreement can be terminated upon sale.
In the current study, the transaction price is correlated to management company and
property level data in the U.S. In addition to the geographic difference, the larger sample of
6,395 hotels enabled a focus on the impact of management leading up to terminal value; hence,
historical value creation versus the implied perceived value that a management contract or a
lease might have on a going-forward basis. This study builds on hedonic pricing as a more
sophisticated econometric technique similar to Hodari et al. (2017) and parlayed quantitative
elements that enable management to better perform, such as size and match, with the types of
properties under management. Thus, this research contributes to the existing literature by further
enhancing knowledge of the determinants of hotel sales prices.
Until the mid-1990s, owners had very few choices of third-party management firms.
Most options they did have were larger hotel brands (e.g., Marriott, Hilton). Hodari et al. (2017)
noted that with increased ease of electronic connectivity, more independent management
companies were able to get established to operate multiple hotel properties and scale their
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operation geographically. Depending on the type of building, many current hotel owners are
larger, sophisticated private equity or institutional investors who lack the know-how to operate a
hotel; and they generally are not equipped or interested in getting involved in the operation.
Therefore, contracting with a professional hotel management company enables owners to focus
on their capabilities in financial planning and redeployment of capital.
On the other hand, management companies can run an asset-light model with no start-up
expense to invest in real estate and defray all costs to ownership (Blal & Bianchi, 2019; Sohn et
al., 2014) which enables them to grow rapidly. Sohn et al. (2014) explained asset-light models as
businesses that pursue a fee-based business model without large capital investments. Several
management companies and franchisors operate asset-light businesses in the hotel business as
they provide services to the hotel owner with little or no investment in the physical brick and
mortar. Management firms tout their reach, staff retention, and best practices for
revenue/expense management as reasons why owners should contract with them. They develop
and leverage complicated information technology (IT) systems that manage revenue yield,
payroll, accounting, marketing, negotiated purchase order procurement, and have regional access
to staffing quicker than standalone operations. Much of the duties described, including IT
systems, revenue management, and operating best-practices, take years to create and come with a
high cost that can usually only be absorbed above a specific platform size. This creates an
unofficial relationship between the ability of a firm to optimize its output and the number of
locations it has under management.
Given that management relies on subject matter expertise, economies of scale, and
resources, my research examines the effect of management size as an element of economies of
scale to ascertain its impact. For example, a recent interview with the leadership of a large
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independent hotel management company pointed to scale as a leading force for their recent
success (Wroten, 2020). Given the rise of management firms over the last 20+ years, it has
become increasingly important to create tools that enable investors to make intelligent business
decisions on management firms that can help yield the highest returns for their real estate assets.
Research Question
This research study investigated the impact of the management company on the hotel
property sale price. It specifically tested whether the size of the management company influences
transaction prices. A company’s size was measured by the number of hotel properties under
management. The following research question provided focus to the research:
What is the relationship between the number of properties that a hotel
management company manages (management size) and the corresponding sale
price premium?
Three hypotheses were examined to provide detailed clarity and progressive depth to the
research question. First, the question of a reverse U-shape effect on sales price was tested to
examine if there is a correlation and if such correlation is indeed reverse U-shape (positive
initially, then negative for larger management groups). Second, the impact of the hotel size was
examined to ascertain if internal scale within the building because of local operational
capabilities has a positive or adverse effect on management size impact. Finally, the basic
concept of location premium was tested to quantify the effects of market compression and urban
resources on management size impact.
Significance of the Research
Hodari et al. (2017) acknowledged the impact of management contracts focusing on the
effect of such contractual encumbrance on the transaction price. My proposed approach
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attempted to take their finding a step further by investigating potential effect of economies of
scale of the management company as an independent variable. Thus, my study attempted to fill a
void in academic research and introduce a new variable in hedonic pricing models.
Findings from this research might help to increase investment power and decisionmaking capacity. They could also provide guidance for buyers and owners to better model and
quantitatively benchmark optimal management companies to derive the highest market value for
each investment deal. The findings might also be used by an owner in negotiating more
competitive fee structures with management firms that drive lower premiums in sales price. In
addition, lenders could use the data to include probabilities of borrowers presented business
models to increase or decrease debt/value ratios. Ultimately, the appropriate matching of a
property and management will increase an investor’s success by optimizing potential sales value.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
While some ownership groups also manage hotels, this research did not distinguish
management companies who are independent from hotel ownership, given its general focus to
understand the impact of management on hotel resale premiums. Management companies present
their value as being able to leverage “superior operating expertise, economies of scale, and
resources” (Hodari et al., 2017) in order to drive increased operating results. In addition, while
some management agreements are signed with a brand (i.e., who is/has the choice to license the
mark or to negotiate a management agreement), this research did not distinguish between
management contracts that come with a franchise or without; albeit the study did control for
brand impact within the analysis. Previous research can be organized into four interdependent
specialties: (a) Agency Theory; (b) Value of Branding; (c) Market Valuation Methods; and (d)
Value of Management. However, the relationship between the management size and the hotel
property value has not been investigated in the existing body of research. To fill the void, this
study analyzed the impact of hotel management size as proxied by the number of hotels under
management, on the hotel value as proxied by the sale price. The area of focus in the current
study is depicted in the green box illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Determinants Influencing Hotel Transaction Value
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Agency Theory
A major group in the literature addresses the Agency Theory, which describes varying
conflicts between stakeholders, in this case between owners and management companies.
Eisenhardt (1989) defined agency theory as a conflict of goals and desires between the parties
with the inability of one to verify the action of the other. Eisenhardt (1989) also examined
different attitudes towards risk given conflicting priorities.
In this context, the basics relate to contractual capital terms in which both a management
company and a brand are incentivized to grow management fee income that are most commonly
laid out in a hotel management agreement (HMA) or a Franchise Agreement (FA) as a
percentage of total hotel revenue (Hodari et al., 2018; Schlup, 2004). Conversely, owners focus
on income and profitability to meet debt and shareholder distribution commitments and calculate
property value. Prior to 1990, a limited number of companies offered management services yet
10

held the majority of market share (e.g., Marriott, Hilton, Wyndham) (Hodari et al., 2018). Many
smaller companies came into existence with increased competition and growing ease of
electronic distribution through online channels. Newer companies offer purely management
services, providing owners the option to manage their hotel as a franchised operation under a
larger brand (Marriott, Hilton) or as an independent unflagged hotel. Several of these
management companies have grown in the number of properties/number of rooms managed as
well as geographically and now compete in scale with some of the more notable brands.
DeRoos (2010) described the legal separation of management contracts from brand
contracts. DeRoos (2010) claimed that even when contracted with one company instead of a
franchise and an independent hotel management company, contractual terms separate fees as
they may be advantageous from a tax or a termination point of view. The combination of
branding and management may be advantageous to the brand on many levels, including fees,
termination, term, and more (DeRoos, 2010). Table 1 displays an excerpt from the April 2020
issue of Hotel Business magazine and provides the 2019 annual ranking of third-party
management companies. In comparison, Table 2 shows the leading hotel brands by number of
properties.
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Table 1
Annual Ranking of Management Companies

Source: Hotel Business Magazine. https://togo.hotelbusiness.com/article/annual-ranked-list/
12

Table 2
Largest Hotel Brands in the World

Source: Chepkemoi, Joyce. (2019, January 11). The Largest Hotel Chains in the World.
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-largest-hotel-chains-in-the-world.html

Farquhar (1989) established brand equity as “added value endowed by the brand on the
product” (p. 24). Aaker (2009) further developed the concept that brand value, brand awareness,
and affiliated quality are basically a staple of the consumer’s mind. Omar and Haywood (2014)
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examined branding in corporate real estate and established that corporate real estate management
brands attribute to customers’ perceptions and expectations of a company.
O’Neill and Xiao (2006) looked at a sample of 1,100 hotel transactions and concluded
there is a strong correlation between hotel branding and transaction price. They found that
different brands have varying degrees of impact on transaction price. The authors’ focus was to
ascertain whether different brands within predefined hotel quality/service categories deliver
different impacts to sales price while controlling for Average Daily Rate (ADR), occupancy,
profitability, and location. They retrieved data over a 15-year timeframe then first deployed
ANCOVA, followed by Tukey multiple comparison tests to match results of properties with
similar locations/age/quality to determine variance impact. The findings revealed that certain
brands had a higher variance between sales prices, especially in the midscale and upscale
segment (i.e., a high spread in low/high pricing increases the measure of risk for such investor).
The intent of such data would help investors in the decision-making of a brand for their assets
based on the intended business plan for the property.
Value of Hotel Brands
Dick (2019) noted that O’Neill and Xiao (2006) did not separate out Branded versus
Independent hotels in their research. Dick’s (2019) review indicated significance in the
correlation of Revenue per Available Room (RevPAR) and profitability to sales price for full
service branded properties. In contrast, branding did not present a strong predictor of sales value.
Findings of related studies indicated a limited impact of branding on operating
performance, as measured by ADR, occupancy, and other metrics (Carvell et al., 2016; Dev &
Withiam, 2012). O’Neill and Matilla (2004) also noted large amounts of consumer data that
provided brands with an operating advantage.
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Carvell et al. (2016) used a similar method to ascertain the operating impact of a hotel
with and without brand affiliation. Their twist was to use a matched pair approach to control for
age and location and apply the Newey-West (1987) estimator to derive their perceived
covariance impact. Their analysis revealed that brand affiliation did not deliver an effect on
operation, with unbranded properties running a higher ADR and branded properties having a
higher occupancy.
Pedrini and De Bernardi (2019) examined German owners’ propensity to brand their
property based on historical perception and grounded in a measure of transaction cost theory on
pricing. Their findings revealed that in cases where owners had a higher concentration of
experience with a brand, there was a higher likelihood of affiliation; however, they also found
that uncertainty did not influence the owners to brand.
Hotel Value Calculation Methods
Corgel and DeRoss (1993) attempted to quantify the ADR rule to ascertain hotel sales
value. Their analysis and sample testing resulted in illuminating that ADR can be used as a
predictor of property market value when comparing a consolidated group of hotels of similar
quality in aggregate, but individually when deploying a matched pair of attributes between
selected small samples in which the pricing differ tremendously, providing for a large range
within one sigma.
The current literature presents three methods applied as approaches for appraising the
market value of a hotel: sales comparison, income capitalization, and cost (Deroos & Rushmore,
2003; Dick, 2019). The choice of valuation depends on the type of building and available data at
the time of transaction.
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The sales comparison approach looks at comparative assets that recently traded which
had similar characteristics to ascertain a potential benchmark. Income capitalization takes
EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) and multiplies it by the
market benchmark for similar market transactions in the same product type. Lastly, the cost
approach estimates the approximate cost of the land, building, equipment, and contents based on
replacement and the amortized age.
Dick (2019) controlled for ADR and occupancy and utilized univariate regression and
ANCOVA to control for value premium related to a brand impact. O’Neill and Xiao (2006)
quoted DeRoos (2006) when establishing the concept of Business Enterprise Value (BEV), as
used by the Appraisal Institute (Appraisal Institute, 1996): “…a value enhancement that results
from items of intangible personal property, such as market and management skill, an assembled
workforce, working capital, trade names, franchises, patents, trademarks, nonrealty-related
contracts or leases, and some operating agreements” (p. 578). A review of the literature did not
provide a more recent update to such a definition and, notably, items such as management skill,
the workforce, and some operating agreements were part of the offered value of a management
company instead of the brand/a franchise; hence, management should be considered in
establishing value.
Hodari et al. (2017) attempted to address the investment market myth that hotels that are
unencumbered by management might sell at a premium to those bound to a management
agreement. The perception behind this notion originated from a business perspective that an
investor might experience increased flexibility to reposition an asset and extract more value
when not limited by operating agreements. Similar to Dick (2019), Hodari et al. (2017) preferred
the use of a Hedonic pricing model with semi-log variation by unit price impact and used sales
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transactions in the U.K. over a 15-year timeframe while controlling for ADR, occupancy,
location, and property age. Their findings revealed that hotels encumbered by a management
agreement sell at for a higher price than unencumbered properties during times of economic
growth and sell at a similar price per key during an economic slowdown. They highlighted
additional benefits in the cost of debt, as there is a much larger pool of lenders willing to
underwrite branded assets versus those that are run independently and are not supported by a
larger sales pipeline provided by a name known to consumers. Lastly, the impact of
encumbrance was reduced when focusing on the subset of London hotels. In addition, during
times of financial distress, hotels encumbered by management contracts are sold at a discount to
unencumbered hotels. The U.K. is a mature market for hotel lease structures which offers
investors a risk mitigation premium on sales price. As it relates to management contracts, Hodari
et al. (2017) assumed that such contracts probably had favorable terms that were viewed as value
add by investors. Not surprisingly, the effect diminished in London hotels because of the limited
supply of transactions in the market, which prompted more competitive bidding for encumbered
and unencumbered hotels.
Valentin and O’Neill (2018) reviewed the location of a hotel as impact to sales price
based on the Central Place Theory, often referred to as location, location, location, by accessing
data from Real Capital Analytics. They conducted individual tests of the value of hotel real estate
against the distance from city center, tourism points of interest, proximity to airports, proximity
to railroad stations, distance to highway nodes, against the quality of the neighborhood, against
local crime levels, and proximity to scenic environments. Regression analysis was applied to
understand spatial variable effects on the log of locations and the noted attributes. The findings
revealed a higher correlation between the sales price and location in the immediate vicinity to
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city-center, with other location attributes less significant; however, as distance increased, the
relationship decreased.
The income valuation approach applies a multiple to a hotel’s income to determine its
market value. Such a multiple, often coined capitalization rate or cap rate, changes according to
market. It is dependent on several elements, such as the type of hotel and the market location.
O’Neill and Matilda (2007) examined the relationship between revenue and net income with
respect to the impact of a brand. They first applied linear regression then hierarchical regression,
which is similar to the attribute analysis mentioned previously. Their findings revealed that
higher revenue drives higher net income in net dollars but not in profitability margin. They also
found that brands have an impact on the relationship of income and profit margin, highlighting
that hotels that can run higher rooms revenue also show a higher profit percentage with an
affiliated impact on hotel value.
Value of Management
Much of the literature uses the term brand to represent the operating impact of hotel
properties. While the brand might push guest reservations through its sales funnel, it is ultimately
the hotel management company that actually makes pricing decisions, employs the staff, and
decides on most expense structures. Hodari et al. (2018) surveyed General Managers to ascertain
the influence that owners have on a hotel’s performance. Their findings revealed that owners
have a higher impact on financial results than the management company, especially in
independent properties. In those properties where a stricter management contract is in place and
there is a higher level of distrust between owner and management due to a misalignment of
incentives, the result was that often times asset managers are hired by ownership to push the
management company’s performance and drive the owner’s agenda.
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Affiliated research has been conducted on Total Quality Management (Chandler &
McEvoy, 2000, Douglas & Judge, 2001; Reed et al., 2000), which is a form of systematic
approach for management to improve business planning and deployment to reach competitive
advantage. Opponents claim Total Quality Management (TQM) is hard to implement and costprohibitive, and there has not been empirical evidence to show a systematic advantage over the
competition (Kunst & Lammink, 2000; Powell, 1995); nevertheless, there is a general consensus
that TQM leads to many stakeholder advantages including customer satisfaction (Chandler &
McEvoy, 2000; Wiele & Brown, 1998). Temtime (2003) found that there is not only a statistical
significance between TQM and firm size but also an even stronger relationship between TQM
and planning behavior that is explained by the detail of TQM implementation such as more
complicated decision-making capabilities in larger firms.
My attempt to uncover similar studies of management impact on sales value in other real
estate asset classes to apply the findings to hotels potentially had limited results. As noted earlier,
Hodari et al. (2017) used a panel approach to measure the impact of having an HMA on sale
value, revealing that encumbered hotels sold at a premium to unencumbered properties.
Encumbrance was defined as the limitation placed by an extended management contract that
lessens an owner’s ability to achieve higher profitability for their hotel from another
management while providing long-term stability from a professional management group.
Li and Monkkonen (2014) took a novel approach to examine the perception of industry
experts on the potential impact of market value based on different management companies. The
authors created phantom listings of residential properties in Hong Kong, branding the same
listings as managed by various companies. The management companies used were of varying
degrees; some more known in the market as award winning companies and some smaller, with
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one company fabricated for the exercise. They presented experts similar listings while changing
the management company on the listing. Findings revealed the significance of the value within a
hedonic pricing model wherein value estimates by experts were higher for properties that were
managed by more established and recognized management companies, with a significant impact
on the relationship in older properties that needed more extensive maintenance.
Hospitality literature indicates management actions or inactions have a significant impact
on valuation in the form of increase or decrease of revenues and expenses and subsequent
income but does not concretely relate the market value to the characteristics of the incumbent
management company (DeRoos & Rushmore, 2003; Monsen, 2007; Fu et al., 2013). In addition,
management literature shows the association between TQM and firm size (Temtime, 2003;
Chandler & McEvoy, 2000). However, there is no existing literature that combines these two
strands to assess how the characteristic of a management company (size, in particular) is
associated with asset valuation in the hotel sector.
In addition, the current body of literature revealed the interdependent relationship among
four specialties: (a) Agency Theory; (b) Value of Branding; (c) Market Valuation Methods; and
(d) Value of Management, with a growing emphasis on the input that management provides to
asset sales price value. A gap was found in academic research for the value of management with
even less research in hotels as a subject asset class.
Economies of Scale
Motivation for the current research was based on a reverse U-shaped economies of scale
model effect on sales price to test if profits initially improve above the proportional increase in
firm size. Chandler and Hikino (2009) described the benefits of scale in terms of marketability as
a competitive advantage. The authors explained that the advantage of growth makes initial sense
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to capture market share; however, there comes the point where the addition of new operating
units only makes sense if it results in a reduction of managerial or distribution expense or
improvement of product quality (p. 17). They distinguish between size defined by economies of
scale and level of expertise defined by economies of scope to highlight firms that have various
types of products and need a variety of distribution channels (pp. 19-20).
In industrial companies that are more capital intensive, Chandler and Hikino (2009)
found that a certain volume of production is needed to be maintained to keep profitability;
however, cost advantages of scale and scope only help as long as their suppliers can continue to
handle volume increases equally or if specific tasks such as sales or technology are brought in
house. Similar observations were gained in modern enterprise companies with the exception that,
unlike industrial capitalism, rather than buying and integrating new companies to achieve scale,
the modern enterprise preferred to contract out non-core activities “…to counter the bureaucratic
inertia in hierarchical institutions” (p. 39).
Interestingly, Chandler and Hikino (2009) found that in labor-intensive industries such as
food and drink, smaller unit firms succeeded more. They speculated this was since the level of
task expertise was not high; hence, a larger pool of employees did not result in an applicable
competitive advantage (p. 46). However, if such firms required access distribution chains, larger
firms that had scale of size and scope had their own accessibility to markets and did not need to
integrate with other firms, thus also did not help other firms grow at their expense (p. 61).
Wicker et al. (2014) referenced Chandler and Hikino (2009) when testing if size matters
under the framework of club theory, which they explain as the ability to “…pool resources and
mutual benefits from sharing production costs” (Wicker et al., p. 268). They highlighted that the
relationship between membership size growth and benefit is not linear, since the benefit from
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lower costs is counteracted by more congested clubs which may lead to a loss of membership. In
other words, based on the assumption of cost elasticity, the rate of output due to efficiencies
would initially exceed the increase in scale, then meet the increase in a proportional manner, and
finally drop in excess of the proportional increase. Wicker et al. (2014) conducted a survey of
6,098 club members to solve for the log of cost/member and cost/sport to check on scale and
scope. Although they could not pinpoint to an optimal club size between a decrease of costs and
decrease in membership, they were able to support an optimal number of products (in their
example, number of sports) which could lead to a loss of efficiency since the size of the club
cannot be shrunk to accommodate the number of sports.
Jain and Robinson (2020) examined if owners of larger portfolios of real estate in a
market can command higher rental rates. They explained this via brand recognition and building
amenities but categorized the sample by the number of buildings under management. The authors
showed that scale buyers and sellers have a positive and significant coefficient, and that rental
premium exists for scale owners. They concluded that positive results might be because of local
brand premiums, but they might also be because of more efficient management structures.
The concept of diseconomies of scale (Bolton & Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000;
Stein, 2002; Williamson, 1975) acknowledges that larger firms enjoy efficiencies, yet highlights
that when such firms grow too large there are operating issues such as communication delays.
Williamson (1975) researched hierarchical systems of companies to understand efficiencies.
Findings established that management of complex firms often sacrifices a company's culture to
support standardized processes and simplify communication. Thus, the term ‘diseconomies’ (of
scale) was created. Bolton and Dewatripoint (1994) examined the tradeoff between specialization
and communication in larger firms with communication costs as a dependent variable, revealing
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that a decrease in communication cost has a positive effect on productivity. Garicano (2000)
built on Williamson (1975) by examining firms who aim to structure the acquisition of
knowledge to reduce costs and again focuses on the quantity of specialization as a potentially
negative effect. These pioneers of diseconomies of scale argued that, in certain circumstances,
scale is somewhat of a reverse U-shape effect that is not exponential to growth, initially rising at
a faster pace, then tapers and may drag a company’s productivity downwards after a certain
degree of complexity.
Stein (2002) further challenged the adage that bureaucracies may burden larger
organizations, claiming they may suffer under lack of productivity. Stand-alone entities were
modeled against a structure where the entities were subsidiaries of a company and needed to
communicate soft and hard information (proprietary complex, or structured and standardized). In
addition to productivity, Stein (2002) also looked at the benefits of financing capabilities from a
lender. Results showed that when information is hard to document and communicate,
hierarchical management may be disadvantaged by relying on potential human error in diligence
processes. In other words, while various levels of management may need to be convinced, even
when properly documented, a lot of paperwork may not be a productive use of time. Stein (2002)
pointed to such problems in M&A transactions of banks that may not be able to provide the level
of small business lending given the need for diligence and understanding on a local level.
Application of the aforementioned models on the private equity industry (Harris et al.,
2014; Lopez-de-silanes et al., 2015) did not find a direct relationship between fund size and
returns, but suggested that firms that handled multiple transactions simultaneously
underperformed in a variety of returns including public market multiple and deal level internal
rate of return (IRR). Harris et al. (2014) studied the performance of portfolios as controlled by
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venture capital (VC) and then subsequently by larger buyout funds. Unlike previous academic
research, their 25-year dataset came from Burgiss, a database that details financial performance
and enables one to examine a research quality dataset that includes cashflows for each fund.
They found there is no direct correlation between fund size and financial performance. They also
established that VCs in the smaller size quartile underperform compared to larger VCs.
Harris et al. (2014) studied various relationships between performance indices such as
IRR, investment multiples, and Public Market Equivalent (PME) against the fund performance,
capital flows, and fund size. Their findings highlighted that while larger buyout firms do not
show a significant correlation between fund size and performance, there is a diminished effect as
fund size grows, which is in line with other research on diseconomies of scale.
Lopez de Silanes et al. (2015) examined the effect of Private Equity (PE) fund size
against performance. They explained that because PE is often customized, automating such a
process to achieve efficiency while growing would diminish their impact on investments. They
compared firms that are different in size and divided them into deciles, hypothesizing that larger
firms could be organized into smaller units to compete with their smaller counterparts. They
showed a substantial decrease in IRR achieved between funds that handle multiple transactions
at one time to those that manage smaller portfolios. They carved their sample into various
subsections to exclude specific transaction years and exclude certain buyer groups and
geographies. In all cases, the coefficient was significant and showed a negative effect on IRR
based on size. Their research findings concluded that in addition to diseconomies of scale
because of communication and hierarchies (as presented in previous academic literature),
diversification of PE is the equivalent of diseconomies of scope evidenced by a regression
against the number of industries that the sample PEs are pursuing actively.
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Previous research linked the concept of economies of scale to various industries'
performance metrics (Chandler & Takashi, 1990; Temtime, 2003; Wicker et al., 2014). The
common thread in the literature is that scale and scope significantly impact various performance
outcomes. In the hotel industry, such performance outcomes are those that would fall within
management scope. Findings in the literature revealed that minimum significant size is required
for the ability to compete (White, 1979); nevertheless, the optimal size is reached after which the
incremental size impact diminishes. As a practical example, in the year 2020 and during the
Coronavirus pandemic, Sonesta Hotels quickly scaled the number of properties under
management. In a CoStar published article (McCracken, May 2021), their CEO was highlighted
regarding how scale is helping the company reach significant expense savings with vendors such
as online travel agencies and attract increased demand from customers.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Overview
This research examined the relationship between the size of a management firm and the
premium or discount an owner gets when selling the hotel to determine the impact of
management company scale on a hotel sales premium. A hedonic approach was applied to create
a model that will enable hotel owners to quantify the impact of a hotel management firm on sales
value premium. The findings should enable future researchers to distinguish between brand and
management in order to create additional variables within hedonic pricing approaches.
Smith (1971) initially recognized the application of Hedonic pricing methodologies in
real estate, and then it was further developed and published by Rosen (1974). The Hedonic
pricing model hypothesis states that goods are valued on the sum of their attributes with the
ability to ascertain each component to manipulate the total sum. As such, P=f(x), controlling for
individual attributes such as location, age, size, type of hotel, etc.
Research Design and Approach
Unlike previous research that examined performance for publicly traded real estate
companies, this study looks at the effect of management size leveraging detail property level
financials, transaction data, and geospatial data. The approved IRB can be found in Appendix A.
In addition, and distinct to other real estate asset types, the seasonality and temporality of the
operating business of hotels far exceeds the marginal impact that management might have in
other building types such as office, residential, industrial, retail, and office, where longer-term
leases do not require quick reaction and where sufficient notice can be given to ramp up sales
and marketing, plan labor, and reduce contractual obligations. The following hypotheses
regarding management’s impact on a hotel real estate sales value was investigated:
26

Hypothesis 1: Literature suggests an inverse U-shaped effect of scale on sales price. The
size of the management company has a positive impact on sales price until a certain
management size. Management companies that exceed a certain size have a negative
effect on sales value.
Smaller hotel management groups may lag in technology and sophistication to their larger
counterparts. As they add resources, they can quickly improve their exposure to more markets
and more clients and have a more considerable purchasing power and labor pool. However,
management companies that are too large may need to adhere to standardized training for staff,
thereby removing local touches. Large management companies may also need to add resources
that are only required for a specific subset of their hotels (e.g., ski resorts); however, all hotels
under management may need to absorb such corporate expense. On the one hand, previous
studies regarding economies of scale and firm size have shown a positive impact of size on the
investment returns (Chandler & Hikino, 2009; Jain & Robinson, 2020; Wicker et al., 2014). On
the other hand, the body of literature on diseconomies of scale highlights issues in areas such as
communication and hierarchies in organizations that exceed a certain size (Bolton &
Dewatripoint, 1994; Garicano, 2000; Harris et al.,2014; Lopez de Silanes et al., 2015; Stein,
2002; Williamson, 1973). Papers on economies of scale would support an increased efficiency of
operation and greater access to customers and, according to the literature on diseconomies of
scale, such positive impact of scale would taper off and may even turn into a negative effect after
a particular size. In other words, based on the assumption of cost elasticity (Wicker et al., 2014),
the rate of output due to efficiencies would initially exceed the increase in scale, then meet the
increase in a proportional manner, and then drop in excess of the proportional increase.
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Presenting this visually with sales price on the y axis and size on the x-axis would result in a
reverse U-shaped presentation.
Hypothesis 2: Larger hotels have more in house resources and are therefore less reliant
on remote support. Thus, management size impact varies by hotel size.
In addition to the literature presented that highlighted the importance of location (Hodari et al.,
2017; Valentine & O’Neill, 2019), focus on a property level enables one to unveil operating
efficiencies that a larger management group may have centrally, or regionally, which could
reduce the need for on-site resources. As an obvious example, this may relate to supportive
services such as accounting, sales and marketing, revenue management, and human resources
that a smaller hotel may not be able to hire to have all those with expertise on payroll. In some
instances, and in some locations, third-party consultants may also be available to outsource this,
but most larger management groups offer centralized services that enable them to allocate such
services back to smaller hotels based on the time spent or by the number of rooms.
On the one hand, partnering with a larger management group allows for smaller hotels to
have access to a level of expertise that they may not have or may not have been able to afford if
they were required to support it on their own. It also signifies that smaller hotels have access to
‘out of the box’ tools such as a hiring pool, human resources training templates, and pre-existing
distribution technologies such as a booking engine and website templates, reducing startup costs
and improving time to market. On the other hand, larger hotels may need larger on-site staff to
provide needed services to satisfy internal volume, which would reduce the benefit and reliance
on the larger management company. Because larger management groups are built to provide
services and support to their hotels, such services often do not come à la carte, but rather
standardized to all, which means that the allocation of such corporate expenses may exist even if
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duplicated on a local level. Larger hotels may have more specific needs by location, which may
conflict with larger management services, which could mean that the hotel is unnecessarily
burdened with expenses related to adapting to the larger management group. An example may be
management groups that are publicly traded and require their properties to go through lengthy
audits with larger accounting firms. That may mean that smaller hotels would receive a
proportional higher benefit than their larger hotel counterparts.
Hypothesis 3: Hotels located in Gateway locations (city centers) enjoy a location benefit
that offers market-based customer demand and a larger pool of employees and vendors,
diminishing the impact of management. Management size will be more impactful in NonGateway locations.
Location–location–location has been the gold standard for real estate. It is, therefore, expected
that hotels in high compression city markets would enjoy a destination premium that drives
business to their location. Pivo and Fisher (2011) examined the value of real estate against the
local walk score (a measure that quantifies the level of walking accessibility), the building
characteristics such as the number of floors, and regional demographics such as crime statistics.
They found an increase in property values and a decrease in cap rates (calculated as income/sales
price) in all asset classes but industrial. Similarly, Barkham and Park (2011) examined the
decision to lease versus buy real estate for corporations with various location variables including
access to labor, clients, transportation, and marketability. Their results indicated that locations
that are closer to customers, labor, and are in prominent locations have a greater probability of
being purchased versus leased. In addition, Blengini and Das (2021) studied hotel asset
characteristics to predict the likelihood of rebranding an asset. They uncovered that airport and
interstate hotels are more likely to change brands than metro locations, contributing to the level
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of perceived investment risk by location. It is, therefore, expected that superior locations will
diminish the impact of management size given guests, vendors, and staff may choose a specific
hotel simply as a matter of convenience to be close to the conference, work, or the reason for
travel.
Gateway locations make available standardized services enjoyed by all participants,
regardless of the size of management. For example, these services may include the laundry
provider who charges similar rates to all hotels in the area, or collective bargaining agreements
with labor unions that determine pay rates for employees by class, regardless of management
group. Additionally, it is not uncommon that hotel sales in such markets are measured on a perkey (per room) basis instead of based on yield. However, large convention hotels located in
urban markets require an increased level of sophistication to attract a mix business that supports
the required rooms and other revenues and manages the large workforce. A management group
must have that level of qualitative expertise to support such properties. Therefore, it is expected
that hotels in U.S. Gateway markets will be less impacted by management capability, except
larger hotels that may enjoy a premium if managed by larger management companies.
Determining the current market value of a hotel is both a science and an art. The
dependent variable in this study is described as the transaction value, and the independent
variable is management company size that is qualified by the number of properties under
management. Trailing income statements might provide insights into historical performance;
however, given a hotel’s daily impact of market conditions, forecasts often have varying degrees
of accuracy. For example, a snowstorm in Washington causes an immediate effect on that day’s
visitor volume. It increases cancellations in the day, for the day, and after staff have prepared the
hotel for certain volume of arrivals and are standing by to offer such services. In contrast, if the
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government plans to issue a particular bill or pass a law, it might prompt a sudden increase in
lobbying activity that will promote travel into the city and drive unexpected additional demand to
hotels. Data collected in hotels are highly segmented and, while anomalies such as impacts of
force majeure happen randomly, real estate transactional data rely on consolidated statements of
financials and comparative performance in the market. For this reason, and in line with valuation
methodologies in the industry, it was perceived that a quantitative approach would best address
this dissertation research objective. Given its popularity, a hedonic pricing approach (Blal &
Graf, 2013; Corgel, 1997; MacPherson & Zietz, 2005; Monson, 2009; Rosen, 1974; Smith,
1971) was utilized to control for other independent variables that influence sales price, such as a
hotel’s location, its ADR, occupancy, income, age, and size.
Study Population and Sampling
The data set included 32,708 U.S. hotel sales transactions filtered to a target sample of
6,395 hotel transactions where the name of the management group could be found and operating
metrics were available for the year of the transaction. Transactions occurred between the years
2001 and 2019, with a maximum transaction price of $1.1B and a minimum price of $165,000.
U.S. geographies were not limited; hence, all states and Gateway/Non-Gateway locations were
examined. The following variables were available and controlled:
•

Operational metrics including occupancy, average daily rate, revenue, gross operating
profit, and earnings before interest depreciation and amortization

•

Property metrics including the age of the property, the type of property (as qualified by
Chain Segment), and the number of rooms

•

Transaction metrics including price, Buyer/Seller names
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•

Branding / Chain Segment, Number of properties under management for each year by
each management firm in the sample

•

Location-specific metrics including distance to the closest major city center, distance to
the nearest commercial airport, Lat/Long, exact address, and area median income

Table 3 provides summary statistics for the full sample of 6,395 hotel transactions used in this
study. The sample is subdivided into Gateway and Non-Gateway subsamples. Gateway markets
are as defined by CBRE as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Washington, New York, and
Boston. Non-Gateway are all transactions excluding the Gateway subsample. Sales Price is the
price paid by the hotel buyer, and Number of Rooms is the number of rooms for each property,
both as reported at the time of the transaction to CB Richard Ellis (CBRE) and Real Capital
Analytics (RCA). Number of Properties is the number of properties that a management group
had under management in the year preceding the year of the transaction, as reported by Smith
Travel Research (STR). Occupancy is a percentage and calculated as occupied rooms divided by
total available rooms. ADR is reported in U.S. Dollars and calculated as annual room revenue
divided by occupied rooms. Gross Operating Profit is represented in million ($m) U.S. Dollars,
and is calculated as revenues minus operating expenses as per the Uniform System of Accounts
for the Lodging Industry (USALI). Age is the hotel’s age at the time of the transaction,
calculated as the year of transaction minus the year the property was built. Occupancy, Average
Daily Rate, Gross Operating Profit, and Age are as reported from STR from the year preceding
the year of the transaction. The distance to the closest commercial airport (AirportDist) is as
reported by the Federal Aviation Administration. The nearest major city center
(majorCityCenterDist), as reported by Esri’s Living Atlas, is calculated in Euclidean distance in
degrees Latitude and Longitude and converted to miles. Area Median Income represents the
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reported median income per earner for the zip code in which the hotel is located, as reported by
the 2010 census.
Table 3
Summary of Variables

Sales Price ($)
Number of Rooms
Number of Properties
Occupancy
Average Daily Rate
GrossOperatingProfit ($m)
AirportDist (mi)
majorCityCenterDist (mi)
Property Age
Area Median Income

Sales Price ($)
Number of Rooms
Number of Properties
Occupancy
Average Daily Rate
GrossOperatingProfit ($m)
AirportDist (mi)
majorCityCenterDist (mi)
Property Age
Area Median Income

Sales Price ($)
Number of Rooms
Number of Properties
Occupancy
Average Daily Rate
GrossOperatingProfit ($m)
AirportDist (mi)
majorCityCenterDist (mi)
Property Age
Area Median Income

$

$
$

$

Min
165,000
58
1
13%
20.53 $
(2.40) $
0.2
0.1
1.0
11,755 $

Min
$ 1,600,000
61
1
31%
$
32.20 $
$
(0.97) $
0.3
0.9
2.0
$
25,143 $

$

$
$

$

Min
165,000
58
1
13.0%
20.53 $
(2.40) $
0.2
0.1
1.0
11,755 $
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Full Sample
Max
Mean
$ 774m $ 27,870,716
950
183.047
848
333.59
98%
70%
915.17 $
103.63
53.18 $
2.98
40.3
6.8
318.5
35.8
241.0
22.9
213,688 $
66,549
Gateway Sample
Max
Mean
$675m $ 59,760,239
941
247.215
848
350.506
98%
74%
915.17 $
144.06
52.17 $
5.70
26.6
7.1
55.5
15.8
140.0
31.6
195,165 $
88,814
Non-Gateway Sample
Max
Mean
$774m $ 22,484,878
950
172.21
848
330.733
98.0%
69.1%
750.92 $
96.80
53.18 $
2.52
40.3
6.7
318.5
39.1
241.0
21.4
213,688 $
62,789

Std Dev
$ 49,644,509
130.578
293.172
10%
$
58.63
$
4.50
4.1
48.1
19.2
$
26,379
Std Dev
$ 84,519,231
169.456
305.908
10%
$
86.40
$
6.50
4.1
11.8
27.8
$
28,079

Std Dev
$ 38,402,048
119.467
290.898
10.3%
$
49.36
$
3.88
4.1
51.0
16.9
$
24,134

Data Collection Methods and Instruments
Data was collected from various sources that can be found in Appendix B.
Measures or Operationalization
Currency is generally displayed in single U.S. dollars ($), unless indicated in millions ($m).
Distance is displayed in miles (mi).
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Overview
This chapter discusses the impact of the size of the management company on transaction
price. The data are focused on transaction value as a dependent variable with control of other known
variables.

Data Analysis Methods
The pathway described is a multi-year cross-sectional regression of sales transactions
testing for management company size. The research is comprised of a quantitative study utilizing
a hedonic pricing approach. The presentation includes sample size (N), Mean value (M), the
Standard Deviation (std), and a minimum (min)/maximum (max) value for each of the
coefficients: ADR, occupancy, age, number of rooms, brand, location. A breakdown is
conducted by descriptive categories such as the hotel Chain Segment (economy, midscale,
upscale, luxury), and by location as defined in primary Gateway market, secondary and tertiary,
and management company. In compliance with the request of the data provider to conceal results
from pointing to one management company over another, management groups are divided into
quartiles of sample distribution that include the number of properties they manage. The size of
each grouping ensures a fair distribution of sample sizes among the groupings.
To test Hypothesis 1, this study first subdivides the sample’s management groups into
quartile groups, which supports the data provider’s request and satisfies the testing of the
hypothesis. Next, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) of a semi-log regression (Rosen, 1974) is run
on the full sample, with a log of sales price modeled as:
(1)

Log(Price) = α + MangementSize β1 + HotelSize β2 + Cθ + Sγ + Lφ + Tτ + ε.
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Price is the hotel transaction price. MangementSize is a vector of management size quantile
indicators (quantiles 2-4), and HotelSize is a vector of hotel size quantile indicators (quantiles 24). Control variable matrix C includes occupancy rate (Occupancy), average daily rate (ADR),
gross operating profit (GrossOperatingProfit), distance from the major city center
(majorCityCenterDist), property age (Age), and area median income (MedianIncome). In
addition, also controlled for are hotel Chain Segment fixed effects, S, state level locational fixed
effects, L, and selling time fixed effects, T. Economies of scale research presented are expected
to result in a positive effect in Q2 quartile group and a diminished effect in Q3 and Q4 that may
or may not be higher than the baseline group.
To test Hypothesis 2, the interaction effect of ManagementSize*HotelSize was first added
into the regression to examine the impact of varying sizes of hotels.
(2)

Log(Price) = α + MangementSize β1 + HotelSize β2 + ManagementSize*HotelSize β3
+ Cθ + Sγ + Lφ + Tτ + ε,

where ManagementSize*HotelSize indicates the interactions between MangementSize and HotelSize
vectors. Then, the regression was divided into subsamples by hotel size quartile without

interaction effects to run equation (1).
To test Hypothesis 3, the sample was split into Gateway markets and Non-Gateway
markets. Regression is run for equation (2) with the interaction effect of
ManagementSize*HotelSize to examine the impact of management on hotels in various locations
by quartile.
Preliminary Analysis
Given a reliance on the theory of economies of scale, size is quantified in a quarterly
approach in order to observe the categorical interaction effects of various groupings of sizes, in
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addition to the continuous effect as a main variable. In addition, the size of a subject hotel is
measured as a categorical variable, divided into quarterly intervals.
Table 4 separates the maximum values for each quartile as calculated as equal distribution of
values into four groups for each of the two noted variables. A quartile approach enables one to take

two-group discriminant analysis and simultaneously compare multiple combinations instead of
focusing on one group and one variable at a time (Mattila et al., 2009). Regression values were
examined by main effect and interaction effects, and fixed effects were added to categorical
variables such as the year of transaction and state in which the transaction occurred.
Table 4
Quartile Maximum Values for Management Size and Hotel Size

Results

Q1 Max Q2 Max Q3 Max Q4 Max
Management Size
51
220
677
848
Hotel Size
104
134
218
950

Management Size Regression
Table 5 shows the linear log regression results of sales price effect of the noted variables.
The results include the estimated coefficient (Coef) and the corresponding t-statistic (t-stat) in
parentheses. In addition, the dependent variable is logged.
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Table 5
Regression Results of Management Size

All Groups
(t -Stat)
Coef
(Intercept)
13.6600 ***
76.82
ManagementSizeQ2
-0.0145
-0.80
ManagementSizeQ3
0.0423 *
2.08
ManagementSizeQ4
-0.1967 ***
-9.10
HotelSize
0.0036 ***
39.42
Occupancy
1.5450 ***
21.85
ADR
0.0071 ***
2.50
GrossOperatingProfit
0.0075 *
2.50
majorCityCenterDist
-0.0011 ***
-7.84
AirportDist
-0.0016
-1.03
Age
-0.0011 **
-3.09
MedianIncome
0.0000 ***
5.53
YES
Chain Segment FE
YES
State FE
YES
Year of Sales FE
6,395
Observations
Adjusted R2
0.802
Residual Std. Error
0.487 (df = 6307)
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Note: For presentation simplicity, Chain Segment, Year, and State have been controlled for as fixed
effects (FE). To reverse logged results, the exponential is calculated. The resulting value signifies the
multiplier effect on the mean of the variable. For example, an exponential of 0.0423 in
managementSizeQ2 results in 1.043207, representing an effect of 4.032% times the mean of
ManagementSizeQ2 subsample. All following regression results will be interpreted in such a manner and
presented in brackets after the coefficient effects.
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A visual presentation of the results is provided in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Plot of Regression Results on Management Size

ManagementSize
Log (Salesprice)

Q1
16.483

Q2
16.469

Q3
16.525

Q4
16.287

Note: The fitted values for ManagementSize Q1-Q4 can be calculated as the composite of the Intercept
plus the sum of each regression coefficient multiplied by the mean value for each corresponding
independent variable.

When compared to the baseline group, management size Q2 did not show an effect on
sale price; however, I observe a statistically significant positive effect on log(price) of 0.0423, or
a 4.23% price increase for management size Q3, and a significant negative effect on log(price) of
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-0.1967, or a 17.86% decrease of for management size Q4. Overall, Management Size shows
reverse U-shape impacts on sales price, confirming Hypothesis 1. This warranted a continuous
review of the additional hypotheses.
Hotel Size and Management Size Interaction
Table 6 provides the empirical results when the log of sales price is used as the dependent
variable, including interaction effects between the size of the management company
(ManagementSize) and the size of the hotel (HotelSize). Similar to the trends of the simple
regression in Table 5, the main effects of management size Q3 has a statistically significant
positive interaction effect on log(price) of 0.14 (15%) and a statistically negative effect on
log(price) of -0.17 (-15.6%). The addition of interaction also causes the main effect of
management size Q2 to have a new significant negative effect of -0.13
(-12.2%). As it relates to the interaction effects the results are reversed with management size Q2
interacting with all hotel sizes showing a positive significant effect, management size Q3
showing a negative effect, and management size Q4 delivering a positive effect.
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Table 6
Management Size x Hotel Size Interaction

(t -Stat)
Coef
(Intercept)
14.15 ***
(80.639)
ManagementSizeQ2
-0.13 ***
(-3.477)
ManagementSizeQ3
0.14 ***
(3.485)
ManagementSizeQ4
-0.17 ***
(-3.674)
HotelSizeQ2
0.30 ***
(7.862)
HotelSizeQ3
0.48 ***
(12.814)
HotelSizeQ4
1.05 ***
(26.299)
Occupancy
1.39 ***
(20.061)
ADR
0.00 ***
(22.712)
GrossOperatingProfit
0.06 ***
(27.333)
majorCityCenterDist
0.00 ***
(-5.836)
AirportDist
0.00
(0.955)
Age
0.00 *
(-2.448)
MedianIncome
0.00 ***
(5.197)
YES
Chain Segment FE
YES
State FE
YES
Year of Sales FE
ManagementSizeQ2:HotelSizeQ2
0.14 **
(2.586)
ManagementSizeQ3:HotelSizeQ2
-0.05
(-0.909)
ManagementSizeQ4:HotelSizeQ2
-0.03
(-0.515)
ManagementSizeQ2:HotelSizeQ3
0.30 ***
(5.861)
ManagementSizeQ3:HotelSizeQ3
-0.12 *
(-2.226)
ManagementSizeQ4:HotelSizeQ3
-0.11 *
(-2.097)
ManagementSizeQ2:HotelSizeQ4
0.12 *
(2.382)
ManagementSizeQ3:HotelSizeQ4
-0.15 **
(-2.712)
ManagementSizeQ4:HotelSizeQ4
0.10 .
(1.727)
6,395
Observations
0.806
Adjusted R2
0.481 (df = 6298)
Residual Std. Error
276.902*** (df = 96; 6298)
F Statistic
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
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Figure 3 is a visual presentation of the results. Logically, hotels with the largest size are
associated with higher log sales price; Management Size Q3 is associated with a higher log sales
price for smaller hotels, but the effect decreases for larger hotels. The largest management
groups are associated with lower log sales price.
Figure 3
Management Size x Hotel Size Interaction

Numerical Results:

HotelSize Q4
HotelSize Q3
HotelSize Q2
HotelSize Q1

Q1
17.0666
16.49634
16.31868
16.01408

Management Size
Q2
Q3
17.05356 17.06318
16.66168 16.52508
16.3247 16.41708
15.8838 16.15778
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Q4
17.00213
16.21818
16.12649
15.84886

Table 7 provides the results when the log of sales price is used as the qualifying measure,
focusing on the main effects and as broken out by quartile of hotel size for the consolidated
sample. Management size Q2 and Q4 have a statistically significant negative effect on log(price)
of -0.08 (-7.7%) and -0.15 (-14%), respectively than the main effects to the intercept alone,
related to the effects of hotel size Q1. On the contrary, Management size Q2 has a statistically
significant positive log(price) of 0.13 (14%) than the main effects to the intercept alone, related
to the effects of hotel size Q1.
Table 7
Regression by Hotel Size Quartile
Hotel Size Q1
Hotel Size Q2
Coeff.
t-value
Coeff.
t-value
83.61
(Intercept)
14.30 ***
59.02
13.95 ***
MgmtSize Q2
-0.08 *
-2.24
0.02
0.65
MgmtSize Q3
0.07 .
1.67
0.06 .
1.78
MgmtSize Q4
-0.15 **
-2.82
-0.05
-1.26
8.84
Occupancy
1.33 ***
10.93
1.23 ***
6.87
ADR
0.01 ***
10.65
0.01 ***
GrossOperatingPr
0.06 ***
6.02
0.08 *
2.41
majorCityCenterD
0.00 *
-2.32
0.00
-0.25
AirportDist
0.00
-0.32
0.00
-0.44
Age
0.00 **
-3.04
0.00 ***
-3.34
MedianIncome
0.00 ***
3.43
0.00 **
2.92
ChainSegment FE
YES
YES
State FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
Observations
1629
1628
Adj. R2
0.61
0.68
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Hotel Size Q3
Coeff.
t-value
14.38 ***
35.22
3.42
0.13 ***
0.05
1.34
-5.33
-0.22 ***
8.95
1.32 ***
0.01 ***
8.68
0.07 ***
5.22
0.00 ***
-3.65
0.00
-0.02
0.00
-1.08
0.00 *
2.21
YES
YES
YES
1553
0.70

Hotel Size Q4
Coeff.
t-value
15.49 ***
29.41
0.00
0.01
-0.01
-0.34
0.01
0.21
1.37 ***
7.78
0.00 ***
6.12
0.07 ***
22.40
0.00 ***
-4.52
0.01 **
2.61
0.00
0.28
0.00 *
2.40
YES
YES
YES
1585
0.66

With exception to HotelSize Q4, HotelSize Q1, Q2 and Q3 show a higher quartile value
for mid-sized management companies than ManagementSize Q1. All four Management Sizes
have a lower log(SalesPrice) value for ManagementSize Q4, than ManagementSize Q1. The
results show a more significant reverse U-shape effect of Management Size for HotelSize Q2 and
Q3, than for HotelSize Q1 and Q4; therefore, reconfirming Hypothesis 2 that hotel size has a
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price impact, further examined in the findings section. Figure 4 presents the linear log regression
results of management size on log(SalesPrice) by hotel size quartile.
Figure 4
Management Size regression By Hotel Size Quartile
Panel A – Q1

Panel B – Q2

Panel C – Q3

Panel D – Q4

Market Effects on Management Size Effects
Table 8 enhances the results of Table 7 by examining the Gateway versus Non-Gateway
subsample interaction effects. While significance in the main effects of management size are
primarily correlated to the larger, Non-Gateway sample, significance in negative interaction
effects for management size Q3 relates mainly to the Gateway subsample.
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Table 8
Regression with Hotel Size Interaction for Gateway and Non-Gateway Subsamples
All Groups
Coef
(t -Stat)
(Intercept)
14.15 ***
(80.639)
ManagementSizeQ2
-0.13 ***
(-3.477)
ManagementSizeQ3
0.14 ***
(3.485)
ManagementSizeQ4
-0.17 ***
(-3.674)
HotelSizeQ2
0.30 ***
(7.862)
HotelSizeQ3
0.48 ***
(12.814)
HotelSizeQ4
1.05 ***
(26.299)
Occupancy
1.39 ***
(20.061)
ADR
0.00 ***
(22.712)
GrossOperatingProfit
0.06 ***
(27.333)
majorCityCenterDist
0.00 ***
(-5.836)
AirportDist
0.00
(0.955)
Age
0.00 *
(-2.448)
MedianIncome
0.00 ***
(5.197)
YES
Chain Segment FE
YES
State FE
YES
Year of Sales FE
ManagementSizeQ2:HotelSizeQ2
0.14 **
(2.586)
ManagementSizeQ3:HotelSizeQ2
-0.05
(-0.909)
ManagementSizeQ4:HotelSizeQ2
-0.03
(-0.515)
ManagementSizeQ2:HotelSizeQ3
0.30 ***
(5.861)
ManagementSizeQ3:HotelSizeQ3
-0.12 *
(-2.226)
ManagementSizeQ4:HotelSizeQ3
-0.11 *
(-2.097)
ManagementSizeQ2:HotelSizeQ4
0.12 *
(2.382)
ManagementSizeQ3:HotelSizeQ4
-0.15 **
(-2.712)
ManagementSizeQ4:HotelSizeQ4
0.10 .
(1.727)
6,395
Observations
0.806
Adjusted R2
0.481 (df = 6298)
Residual Std. Error
276.902*** (df = 96; 6298)
F Statistic
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Gateway
Coef
14.68 ***
-0.05
0.27 .
-0.03
0.42 **
0.52 ***
1.07 ***
1.03 ***
0.00 ***
0.06 ***
-0.02 ***
0.00
0.00
0.00 *

(t -Stat)
(49.474)
(-0.352)
(1.654)
(-0.181)
(2.789)
(3.813)
(7.969)
(4.523)
(5.05)
(15.212)
(-7.372)
(0.305)
(-0.676)
(2.143)
YES
YES
YES
(-0.528)
(-2.069)
(-1.255)
(1.105)
(-2.232)
(-1.493)
(-0.736)
(-2.525)
(-0.788)

-0.10
-0.38 *
-0.23
0.19
-0.40 *
-0.26
-0.12
-0.45 *
-0.14
924
0.842
0.477 (df = 871)
95.831*** (df = 52; 871)

Non Gateway
Coef
(t -Stat)
14.18 ***
(79.52)
-0.13 **
(-3.276)
0.15 ***
(3.458)
-0.13 **
(-2.878)
0.31 ***
(7.72)
0.49 ***
(12.499)
1.04 ***
(24.581)
1.26 ***
(17.099)
0.01 ***
(22.642)
0.06 ***
(21.994)
0.00 ***
(-5.057)
0.00
(-0.028)
0.00 ***
(-4.481)
0.00 ***
(3.294)
YES
YES
YES
0.15 **
(2.83)
-0.02
(-0.419)
-0.04
(-0.691)
0.28 ***
(5.284)
-0.09
(-1.632)
-0.14 *
(-2.523)
0.17 **
(3.236)
-0.09
(-1.493)
0.11 .
(1.799)
5,471
0.784
0.472 (df = 5375)
209.590*** (df = 95; 5375)

Figure 5 is a visual presentation of Table 8. Given the subsample sizes, the Non-Gateway
results appear consistent with the consolidated presentation observed negative effects of Q3
management size depicted in Figure 3. Both the quartile analysis and the interaction analysis
show a location variation in the impact of hotel management size on sales price. This confirms
Hypothesis 3.
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Figure 5
Management Size regression By Hotel Size Quartile, Location Effects
Panel A- Gateway

Numerical Results:

HotelSize Q4
HotelSize Q3
HotelSize Q2
HotelSize Q1

Q1
17.70914
17.1602
17.06092
16.64304

Gateway
Q2
Q3
17.53453 17.52583
17.2949 17.03126
16.90737 16.94686
16.59023 16.91165

Panel B- Non-Gateway

Q4
Q1
17.53793 16.9401
16.86665 16.384
16.79804 16.2016
16.61343 15.896

Non-Gateway
Q2
Q3
16.9835 16.9992
16.5389 16.4419
16.2299 16.3257
15.7706 16.0415

Q4
16.9204
16.1076
16.0305
15.7622

Management Size and Chain Segment Interaction
Given that hotels as an asset class differ by level of amenities and service, further
analysis was done on the impact of management with interaction on the various Chain Segments.
Following the methodology presented to test the hypothesis, Table 9 breaks out the results when
the log of sales price is used as the qualifying measure, including interaction effects between the
size of the management company (ManagementSize), and the type of hotel (ChainSegment) for
Gateway and Non-Gateway locations. With respect to interactions, when compared to the
baseline group, hotels with ManagementSize in Q3 have a statistically significant negative
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interaction effect. The only exception to this is in the Luxury ChainSegment, where no statistical
significance is observed.
Table 9
Regression with Management Size x Chain Segment Interaction
All Groups
Coef
(t -Stat)
(Intercept)
14.02 ***
(76.682)
ManagementSizeQ2
0.02
(0.19)
ManagementSizeQ3
0.33 ***
(4.846)
ManagementSizeQ4
-0.17 *
(-2.091)
HotelSizeQ2
0.33 ***
(18.338)
HotelSizeQ3
0.51 ***
(25.816)
HotelSizeQ4
1.05 ***
(39.873)
ChainSegmentMidscale
0.04
(0.567)
ChainSegmentUpper Midscale
0.11 .
(1.664)
ChainSegmentUpscale
0.42 ***
(6.326)
ChainSegmentUpper Upscale
0.40 ***
(5.553)
ChainSegmentLuxury
0.48 ***
(5.442)
Occupancy
1.43 ***
(20.419)
ADR
0.00 ***
(22.207)
GrossOperatingProfit
0.06 ***
(26.696)
majorCityCenterDist
0.00 ***
(-5.629)
AirportDist
0.00
(1.064)
Age
0.00 .
(-1.712)
MedianIncome
0.00 ***
(5.211)
YES
State FE
YES
Year of Sales FE
ManagementSizeQ2:ChainSegmentMidscale
0.30 *
(2.153)
ManagementSizeQ3:ChainSegmentMidscale
-0.19 *
(-2.22)
ManagementSizeQ4:ChainSegmentMidscale
0.14
(0.467)
ManagementSizeQ2:ChainSegmentUpper Midscale
-0.01
(-0.048)
ManagementSizeQ3:ChainSegmentUpper Midscale
-0.23 **
(-2.777)
ManagementSizeQ4:ChainSegmentUpper Midscale
0.05
(0.5)
ManagementSizeQ2:ChainSegmentUpscale
-0.11
(-0.999)
ManagementSizeQ3:ChainSegmentUpscale
-0.39 ***
(-5.149)
ManagementSizeQ4:ChainSegmentUpscale
-0.11
(-1.322)
ManagementSizeQ2:ChainSegmentUpper Upscale
0.05
(0.459)
ManagementSizeQ3:ChainSegmentUpper Upscale
-0.32 ***
(-3.996)
ManagementSizeQ4:ChainSegmentUpper Upscale
0.19 *
(2.125)
ManagementSizeQ2:ChainSegmentLuxury
-0.01
(-0.093)
ManagementSizeQ3:ChainSegmentLuxury
-0.24 .
(-1.902)
ManagementSizeQ4:ChainSegmentLuxury
-0.15
(-1.348)
6,395
Observations
0.805
Adjusted R2
0.481 (df = 6292)
Residual Std. Error
259.685*** (df = 102; 6292)
F Statistic
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Gateway
Non Gateway
Coef
(t -Stat)
Coef
(t -Stat)
14.48 ***
(39.98)
14.05 ***
(75.647)
-0.25
(-0.4)
0.04
(0.349)
0.27
(1.044)
0.33 ***
(4.811)
0.03
(0.117)
-0.18 *
(-2.113)
0.22 ***
(3.615)
0.34 ***
(18.069)
0.41 ***
(6.581)
0.51 ***
(24.605)
0.87 ***
(12.107)
1.06 ***
(37.288)
0.53 .
(1.849)
-0.03
(-0.376)
0.25
(0.946)
0.06
(0.865)
0.67 **
(2.587)
0.34 ***
(5.002)
0.71 **
(2.711)
0.29 ***
(3.84)
1.01 ***
(3.783)
0.22 *
(2.113)
1.14 ***
(4.947)
1.30 ***
(17.466)
0.00 ***
(4.842)
0.01 ***
(22.186)
0.06 ***
(14.513)
0.06 ***
(21.556)
-0.02 ***
(-7.311)
0.00 ***
(-4.806)
0.00
(0.682)
0.00
(0.047)
0.00
(-0.394)
0.00 ***
(-3.779)
0.00 .
(1.922)
0.00 ***
(3.577)
YES
YES
YES
YES
0.15
(0.232)
0.32 *
(2.14)
-0.32
(-0.942)
-0.17 .
(-1.907)
NA
(NA)
0.22
(0.754)
0.35
(0.565)
-0.03
(-0.276)
-0.08
(-0.247)
-0.23 **
(-2.74)
-0.31
(-0.845)
0.10
(0.914)
0.15
(0.234)
-0.11
(-1.022)
-0.45 .
(-1.68)
-0.35 ***
(-4.541)
-0.33
(-1.146)
-0.09
(-0.961)
0.22
(0.359)
0.06
(0.52)
-0.34
(-1.234)
-0.30 ***
(-3.554)
-0.02
(-0.077)
0.20 *
(2.013)
-0.04
(-0.059)
0.19
(1.285)
-0.65 *
(-2.067)
-0.05
(-0.34)
-0.51 .
(-1.735)
0.08
(0.556)
924
5,471
0.841
0.783
0.480 (df = 866)
0.473 (df = 5369)
86.454*** (df = 57; 866)
196.345*** (df = 101; 5369)

Figure 6 presents a visual presentation of the results for the consolidated sample, the
Gateway sample, and the Non-Gateway sample. Management companies with the largest size are
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associated with lower log(SalesPrice) with higher prevalence in the Non-Gateway subsample.
Economy hotels show a positive effect on log(SalesPrice) from management size Q2 into Q3.
Figure 6
Management Size x Chain Segment Interaction Regression
Panel A – Consolidated Sample

Panel B – Gateway Sample

Panel C – Non-Gateway Sample
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Numerical Results:

Q1
Luxury
16.68106
Upper Upscale 16.59869
Upscale
16.62271
Upper Midscale 16.31302
Midscale
16.24391
Economy
16.20143

Consolidated
Q2
Q3
16.68868 16.76288
16.66924 16.60428
16.53559 16.56176
16.32742 16.40711
16.56828 16.37458
16.22113 16.52691

Q4
16.36094
16.6243
16.34097
16.19637
16.21318
16.03327

Q1
17.7078
17.4082
17.365
16.9442
17.2314
16.6965

Gateway
Q2
Q3
17.4257 17.3199
17.3852 17.3351
17.2647 17.1773
17.0533 17.1341
17.1399 17.1824
16.4512 16.9627

Q4
17.2279
17.418
17.0717
16.6705
17.2632
16.7282

Q1
16.354
16.4212
16.4769
16.1938
16.1057
16.1345

Non-Gateway
Q2
Q3
16.5843 16.634
16.5168 16.4545
16.4026 16.4555
16.1998 16.2909
16.4673 16.2648
16.1711 16.4656

Q4
16.2474
16.4385
16.2069
16.1111
16.1438
15.9527

Table 10 provides the regression results focusing on the main effects and as broken out
by Chain Segment. Management size Q3 has a statistically significant negative log(price) of 0.26 (-22.9%) related to midscale hotels and positive effect of 0.11 (11.6%) in the Upper
Midscale Chain Segment. On the other hand, management size Q4 has significant negative
effects in Economy, Upscale, and Luxury, with the most significant negative effect of -0.28
(-24.4%) for Upscale hotels.
Table 10
Regression by Chain Segment
CS Economy
CS Midscale
Coeff.
t-value
Coeff.
t-value
30.42
(Intercept)
14.76 ***
60.71
13.64 ***
MgmtSizeQ2
0.01
0.11
0.11
0.99
MgmtSizeQ3
0.07
0.60
-0.26 **
-2.89
MgmtSizeQ4
-0.40 *
-2.41
-0.16
-0.57
4.84
HotelSizeQ2
0.20 ***
8.32
0.35 ***
4.25
HotelSizeQ3
0.27 ***
7.69
0.34 ***
4.38
HotelSizeQ4
0.80 ***
3.77
0.62 ***
Occupancy
0.33 *
2.30
0.84 **
3.16
3.90
ADR
0.00 *
2.01
0.01 ***
GrossOperatingPr
0.26 ***
5.74
0.22 ***
5.86
majorCityCenterD
0.00
-0.56
0.00
-0.67
-0.79
AirportDist
0.00
1.07
-0.01
Age
-0.01 ***
-4.57
0.00 .
1.87
MedianIncome
0.00
1.20
0.00 *
2.45
YES
YES
State FE
YES
YES
Year FE
1500
385
Observations
Adj. R2
0.73
0.74
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

CS Upper Midscale
Coeff.
t-value
14.13 ***
31.81
0.01
0.31
0.11 *
2.51
-0.07
-1.09
0.44 ***
12.13
0.67 ***
14.93
0.96 ***
14.39
1.56 ***
9.92
0.01 ***
7.16
0.12 ***
6.64
0.00 .
-1.88
0.00
-1.26
-5.69
-0.01 ***
3.88
0.00 ***
YES
YES
1102
0.70

CS Upscale
Coeff.
t-value
14.17 ***
62.86
-3.29
-0.09 **
-0.06 .
-1.78
-8.62
-0.28 ***
9.90
0.33 ***
0.52 ***
15.10
0.99 ***
19.50
1.00 ***
7.65
0.01 ***
12.52
0.10 ***
13.01
0.00 *
-2.07
0.00
1.04
0.00
-0.54
0.00
0.79
YES
YES
2033
0.70

CS Upper Upscale
Coeff.
t-value
15.46 ***
28.51
0.09 .
1.92
0.03
0.61
0.06
1.02
0.29
1.28
0.34 .
1.83
0.75 ***
4.00
0.61 **
2.64
0.01 ***
8.77
0.06 ***
15.09
0.00 ***
-3.66
0.00
0.51
0.00
-1.12
0.00
1.27
YES
YES
1118
0.60

CS Luxury
Coeff.
t-value
16.16 ***
24.33
-0.05
-0.54
-0.21 .
-1.86
-0.19 *
-2.14
0.65 **
3.20
0.63 ***
3.65
1.23 ***
6.81
1.54 ***
3.66
0.00 **
3.26
0.04 ***
8.73
0.00
-1.07
-0.01
-1.14
0.00
-0.85
0.00 *
2.04
YES
YES
256
0.75

Next, Table 11 provides the regression results focusing on the main effects and as broken
out by Chain Segment in Gateway markets. Management size Q3 has a statistically significant
positive log(price) of 0.38 (46.2%) related to Upper Midscale hotels, and positive effect of 0.23
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(25.8%) in the Upscale Chain Segment. Management size Q4 has significant positive effect in
Economy of 1.11 (303%), and a negative effect of -0.3 (-26%) in the upscale Chain Segment.
Table 11
Regression by Chain Segment for Gateway Markets Only
CS Economy
CS Midscale
Coeff.
t-value
Coeff.
t-value
(Intercept)
15.13 ***
17.10
14.20
0.31
MgmtSizeQ2
0.74
1.48
-0.23
-0.46
MgmtSizeQ3
0.19
0.53
0.60
0.12
MgmtSizeQ4
1.11 *
2.36
NA
HotelSizeQ2
0.06
0.91
0.82
0.16
HotelSizeQ3
0.15
1.48
-0.51
-0.24
HotelSizeQ4
NA
0.32
0.03
Occupancy
-0.18
-0.31
1.95
0.02
ADR
0.00
-0.50
0.00
-0.01
GrossOperatingPr
0.21
1.39
0.31
0.10
majorCityCenterD
-0.01 *
-2.42
-0.04
-0.44
AirportDist
0.01
1.61
-0.02
-0.04
Age
-0.01
-1.32
0.01
0.16
MedianIncome
0.00
0.72
0.00
0.20
YES
YES
State FE
YES
YES
Year FE
171
30
Observations
Adj. R2
0.70
0.90
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

CS Upper Midscale
Coeff.
t-value
22.30
13.61 ***
0.14
1.32
0.38 *
2.46
0.10
0.43
3.96
0.54 ***
5.28
0.79 ***
5.29
0.99 ***
1.35 .
1.99
0.01 **
2.76
0.05 *
2.06
0.00
-0.66
-0.01
-1.25
0.00
-0.28
0.00 *
2.03
YES
YES
91
0.90

CS Upscale
Coeff.
t-value
14.91 ***
26.71
-0.18 .
-1.81
-0.23 *
-2.18
-0.30 **
-3.00
0.37 *
2.26
0.50 ***
3.37
0.95 ***
5.57
1.19 **
2.69
0.00 **
3.18
0.07 ***
4.67
-0.01 **
-2.93
-0.01
-0.66
0.00
0.92
0.00
0.12
YES
YES
280
0.72

CS Upper Upscale
Coeff.
t-value
16.69 ***
26.18
-0.07
-0.80
-0.18 .
-1.71
-0.16 .
-1.69
-0.51
-1.33
-0.12
-0.36
0.36
1.10
-0.64
-0.32
4.68
0.01 ***
0.06 ***
9.14
-0.01 *
-2.54
0.00
0.01
0.00
-1.02
0.00
0.94
YES
YES
235
0.72

CS Luxury
Coeff.
t-value
16.27 ***
9.41
-0.10
-0.63
-0.34
-1.49
-0.19
-1.29
0.85 *
2.31
0.92 **
2.83
1.39 ***
3.93
-0.39
-0.39
0.00
-0.42
5.23
0.04 ***
0.03
0.64
0.04
0.57
0.00
-0.73
0.00
1.08
YES
YES
117
0.63

Findings
This research focused on establishing if there was an impact of management size on hotel
value with an anticipation of a reverse U-shape effect between growth in number of units under
management and the corresponding price effect. Hypothesis 1 utilized a regression of the overall
sample and revealed a statistically significant correlation between management size and
transaction price. This analysis showed limited change between Management Size Q1 and Q2 and
a jump in value into Q3, then dropping below all other groups in Q4, presenting a reverse U-shape
behavior. This warranted further research into Hypothesis 2 and 3. These findings reconfirm and
extend the findings of Hodari et al. (2017). While this dataset did not differentiate on the basis of
encumbrance pre and post transaction, an assumption can be made the hotel management
companies in Q1 and Q2 might have offered contractual terms that are more flexible, allowing for
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a termination on sale that can be viewed as an unencumbered transaction, hence a positive effect
with larger companies that require more encumbrance.
Hypothesis 2 tested the influence of hotel size on management size impact. Using a quartile
approach, smaller to midsized hotels showed more significant impact of management size than
larger hotels. As previously noted, this may be explained by the availability of local staff and
knowledge to operate the hotel that is more readily accessible in larger hotels, than in smaller
buildings, where staffing is limited. The plots for Q2 and Q3 size hotels presented a good match
to a reverse U-shape effect of management size, confirming this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 built on the findings of Hypotheses 1 and 2, and layered in the effect of the
Gateway versus Non-Gateway location to test the geospatial effect. The largest hotels showed only
a statistically significant correlation between sales price and management size in Gateway markets.
In Gateway markets, the main variable of management size revealed significance only for the
subsample of the largest hotels with a negative main effect, and when interacting with hotel size
Q3 and with Upscale and Luxury there is a negative effect as well. In Non-Gateway markets, there
is significance to the main effect of the management size variables in all quartile groups and a
positive effect on management size Q2 when interacting with hotels of all sizes compared to the
baseline group. Both Gateway and Non-Gateway coefficient effects can be qualified to represent
reverse U-shaped effects, but there is the effect is stronger (with higher significance) of
management size in the Non-Gateway subsample. Similarly, a diminished effect is seen in Hodari
et al. (2017) in London hotels versus non-London hotels. Hodari et al. (2017) explained that the
buyer profile and limited urban sales inventory may drive the urban market sales premium,
reducing the statistical significance of the results.
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Operationally, the framework of economies of scale makes sense when applying a
geospatial approach. In Non-Gateway cities, smaller management groups need to have access to a
network of employees, smart systems, and purchasing powers that companies in Q1 (with less than
51 hotels) may struggle to have. It is often that manual processes, not understanding local
competitors, and simply being stretched for resources causes hotel companies in Q1 not to be as
productive as companies that exceed that size. This reconfirms the findings of Temtime (2003)
that SMEs often struggle to implement TQM and train their employees due to lack of resources or
simply the narrow vision of the company founder. Temtime (2003) also noted that planning
behavior is more closely linked to TQM practices than firm size.
In this analysis, an improvement in sales price is observed in management size Q2,
potentially driven by increased profitability through better productivity with an effect on sales
price via income capitalization, and in accordance with the increased flexibility of resources per
Temtime (2003). Examples of operating levers for hotel groups in Q2 and Q3 may be central
resources such as reservations, accounting, sales, and risk management, that are located in the head
office or in regional offices, and are allocated back to the hotels at a discount to what in-house
staffing would have cost. In addition, because such centralized staff has cross exposure between
hotels, the level of experience and qualification may exceed that of companies with less hotels
under management. Additional benefits exist by negotiating better vendor agreements, most
notably with more prominent vendors such as online travel agencies and insurance carriers. Lastly,
because the hotel business is highly dependent on personnel, Non-Gateway markets present a
higher barrier to finding good talent than in Gateway markets. Such mid-sized management
companies have a stronger bench of succession planning, allowing relocation of talent and task
force personnel at short notice, when needed.
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In Gateway markets, management size main effect shows a negative effect on hotels in Q4
size with the strongest effect in decrease for Q3 sized management companies. In addition,
negative effects exist for Q3 sized management companies when interacting with all hotel sizes.
The rationale may be that hotels of Q4 size are hard to operate and often include many amenities
such as conference facilities, food and beverage outlets, spa, etc. Such affiliated amenities are
required to support the large number of rooms and attract groups and convention business;
however, those affiliated services often barely operate at profitability after all expenses are
accounted for. Smaller management companies may be able to operate in a more fluid manner with
less stringent guidelines on operating standards throughout the year, if not encumbered by a
franchise, hence they are able to flex staffing and expenses. In addition, large hotels in the noted
Gateway markets are mostly unionized when operated by larger management groups, which adds
another layer of expense and buyer perception of a potential decrease in staff productivity.
From a perception point of view, hotel investors may view hotel management companies
in Q2 as strong, nimble, yet aggressive as they were able to grow from Q1 size and have room to
scale. On the flipside, there is often an impression that management companies may offer reduced
attention to their hotels once a larger size is reached, executing via an automated approach with
limited ability for customization. Lastly, given that Q1 sized management companies are not as
efficient, buyers may assign a premium on sales price for hotels for a perception of additional
upside. The overall positive effect for Q1, Q2, and Q3 sized hotels managed by Q2 companies
indicates a somewhat balanced scale of size and expense and is a key takeaway.
Both the charts and the tables reveal a negative effect when transitioning from Q3 to Q4
sized management companies in the Non-Gateway subsample. While economies of scale
obviously help in management size Q2 and Q3, there may be a reversal of such effects when
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crossing to Q4 size. This may be explained by various reasons related to issues of communication
flow and complicated processes for management companies that become publicly traded and
therefore require additional accounting and asset compliance, a mandated cost that is passed on to
the properties. This is just one example, yet because of size, Q4 management companies often
take a more templated approach to property maintenance, revenue management, sales
qualifications, and other procedures, leading to overspending and increased allocation of expenses
to hotels. Large management companies also require more extensive capital improvements and
ongoing building maintenance, which have impact on operating costs or via required property
improvement plans, or both. Lastly, larger management companies in Q4 often require a longer
management contract that may be more restrictive, similar to Hodari et al. (2017) which may result
in the perception of decreased property value because a new owner has restricted flexibility to
change management of branding to create additional upside in profitability. Smaller management
companies often allow more flexible termination options in their management agreements,
accounting for an upside during transactions.
As it relates to the effects of Chain Segments, the effects do not present a clear linear or
non-linear relationship between the level of hotel and management size, although transactions with
management size Q3 in the Non-Gateway subsample show a statistically significant log(price)
decrease than what is expected from merely adding the main effects, with exception in the luxury
segment, where no statistical significance is observed. Most such effects might stem from
Q3/midscale and Q4/upscale (Table 10). The rationale for these observations may be sourced from
a potential view on the segmentation of clients that visit hotels in such locations. Luxury hotels
and economy hotels are unique in their offering; however, midscale and upscale hotels often
struggle to differentiate in Non-Gateway markets with the type of product and level of service
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interchangeable between Chain Segments. Such hotels then require hands-on customization to
derive successful differentiation, which companies with more than 221 hotels under management
may find hard to offer.
Another observation related to the Chain Segment regression is the strong positive effect
of Management Size Q4 of 1.11 (303%) on Economy hotels in Gateway markets. The explanation
may be that such hotels operate with limited resources and offer limited services to their guests.
They compete in the dense Gateway locations for clients and require robust revenue management
techniques and solid sales pipelines, hence enjoying a premium competitive advantage to Economy
hotels that smaller management firms support.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Overview
The motivation behind this dissertation is market practice that hotels often sell on a
multiple of their income, and that income levels are impacted by the proficiency of the hotel’s
management to generate revenues and control expenses. Proficiency may be driven by the hotel
management company’s experience, which may be quantified by the company’s reach, measured
by the number of hotels under management at the time of the transaction. In most cases,
inefficient management and lack of expertise result in lower revenues and higher expenses,
causing a loss in profitability and decreased property value.
This research began with a review of the literature focused on the impact of management
on hotel real estate market value and determined that what was missing was a correlation to the
framework of economies and diseconomies of scale to determine if size leads to economic or
market advantage, resulting in a reverse U-shape effect. A 19-year sample of U.S. hotel
transactions was used to first examine the impact of the size of the management group on sales
price. The additional hypotheses tested the effect of the size of the hotel and its urban/non-urban
location on management size impact.
Logically, hotels are a unique and complicated commercial real estate asset class that
show varying sales price results based on various variables, including management and location.
All three hypotheses were confirmed with corresponding reverse U-shape results in select
subcategories. Mid-sized management groups that manage more than 51 hotels and less than 220
hotels had the highest positive impact on sales price in Non-Gateway locations. With certain
exceptions, larger management groups showed a negative effect correlation to sales price.
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Implications for Advancing Theory
This dissertation adds new knowledge to a growing area of literature on the impact of
management on hotel performance. Unlike past research that examined organizational structure
to measure the effects of scale and scope, this research used financial output data to correlate
back to size, quantitatively benchmarking financial results. In addition, this is the first known
research that uses property level operating data to research the performance of hotels at the time
of a transaction, whereas the majority of studies have used publicly available data. The current
analysis revealed important insights, including a correlation between management size and sales
price. The analysis also revealed that management size has a positive impact on sales price in
smaller to mid-sized hotels, and that larger management companies have a negative effect on
transaction price in many cases. In addition, locations in Gateway markets showed a decrease in
management size impact, reconfirming the general theory of Location–Location–Location.
The findings of this research could have implications on the four bodies of literature
presented. The results suggest the need to include management attributes when using hedonic
pricing models for hotel sales value. In certain circumstances, this research positions the
management company as having varying degrees of effect on the different variables of a hedonic
pricing model. In other words, if a management company can create new revenue compression
even in subpar locations, find local outsourcing to improve expense ratios, influence the quality
of maintenance of a hotel, and provide jobs for the immediate residents to increase local wealth,
that management company may create varying degrees of effects on hedonic pricing variables of
a larger model. Epistemologically and mathematically, this could challenge the underlying
theory on existing use of OLS for hedonic pricing models. In addition, the impact of
management on examined variables may change by location and time.
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This research further bridges existing literature to current day practices for hotel
management. Such changes include recent evolutions of day-to-day tasks such as the ability of
hotels to compete via simple marketing on Google, Expedia, and on mobile platforms and a
hotel’s ability to outsource non-critical functions such as accounting and IT. Given the change in
the way hotels are managed, an increased focus on the capabilities of its management company
may be deemed necessary.
Implications for Business Practice
A caution is extended to practitioners who seek to apply the results to a specific scenario
by extracting conclusions as absolute results. This dissertation did not present cause and effect;
rather, it examined the impact of management size under the assumption that all other causes
remain equal and controlled for. The model presented in this study focused only on sales price
and ignored other value metrics such as annual cash flow, lender leverage level and loan terms,
customer satisfaction, and owner vanity with owning trophy hotels.
The implications of this research cover many stakeholders and may have many use cases.
However, there are four main hotel stakeholders that may find use for this research: (1) the
owner, (2) the management company, (3) the franchisor, and (4) the Hotel Asset Manager.
Ownership would benefit by pairing each of their assets with management groups that
may return the highest results in sales price value. In addition, smaller ownership groups should
consider the implications of self-management in Non-Gateway locations given the potential
improvement with scale. However, this is not always the case practically. Investors often rely on
relationships with their vendors and may prefer to maintain less contractual relationships with
various management groups in order to decrease the amount of oversight required, and to
demand better financial terms when showing ongoing loyalty and giving one company multiple
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properties. Regardless, investors often limit their exposure to certain markets and Chain
Segments (or even brands), which would allow an investor to solve by asking basic questions
such as, “In markets I intend to invest, which are management companies that have the most
representation in the type of hotels I want to buy?” and “When looking at historical transactions
in those markets, what is the price per key/cap rate for property sales for those management
companies?” Understanding the drivers of such historical transactions by the management
company is not a common practice but would logically yield an in-depth conversation of
qualitative reasoning behind other effects of price premium or loss.
Management companies may find great advantage in this research. Rather than prompting
companies to grow or enter into M&A, the results shed light on considerations that management
companies may weigh to gain the most competitive advantage based on their current size,
specialization, and portfolio locations. Questions to be answered that may help grow their
business might include, “Based on the markets I am in, what are other hotels that may enjoy my
size and my capabilities and are those hotels managed by management companies that may be
inferior in the subject property?” and “What investor groups are growing in the markets I am
focused on and want to invest in the Chain Segment/hotel size I would like to manage?”
Franchisors and brands can leverage the concepts and findings of this research to help
ownership with the selection of management and the process of brand approval of a new
management company. Given the common nature of responsibilities and fee structure between
brands and management groups, it is in the brand’s interest to maintain happy owners that sell
hotels at a premium.
Lastly, the asset manager’s role is to maximize the value of the investment directly
correlated to the body of knowledge covered in this research. The benefits and disadvantages of
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management companies are often discussed between asset managers, and this research puts a
framework of size and location that may help such discussion by proactively recognizing a
potential mismatch between management size, hotel size, geographic area, and Chain Segment to
either prompt a contractual change or work to mitigate the effects of such potential price impact
risk. Highlighting the comparative local disadvantages of such management company (e.g., sales,
central reservations, purchasing) and addressing them operationally and commercially is in the
DNA of a successful hotel asset manager.
Limitations
During the time of this research, the COVID-19 pandemic affected nations worldwide,
which caused great societal, health, and economic damage. As a result, new trends in hotels have
emerged and attributes such as ‘drive to destinations’ quickly grew in importance. In addition,
hotel locations near highways, logistics centers, and medical buildings presented sustained
resiliency via the type of clientele they could gain, even in a major recession. This may cause
location effects on management to differ once this data is available for future studies. It should
also be noted that location and demographic census metrics represented 2019, and might have
shifted slightly over the 19-year timeframe of the analysis.
Unfortunately, the data set did not provide sufficient variety to conduct a panel data
analysis, which would have allowed for one to exclude inflation trending in the pricing.
Hedonic pricing models utilize regressed variables as indicators; however, each deal
needs to be analyzed in detail. Research by Das et al. (2018) established that using traditional
models ignores extreme attributes of a property. Property attributes have a significant impact on
transaction prices in premium hotels, whereas they have a diminishing effect in discount hotels
(Das et al., 2017). Future research could consider the impact of management by pricing tranche
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to separate price classifications/quartiles and measure those by market to understand the
increase/decrease of management impact against the index (a local average) of similar properties
with similar attributes in a market.
Recommendations for Future Research
The separation of terminology between management and branding will allow for further
examination of a myriad of other effects that are tied to the management company that operates
the building. While this research focused on hotels as a real estate asset class, the underlying
hypotheses behind this study should be examined for other asset classes, predominantly
residential and office buildings where rent structures may include services provided by building
management.
The findings of this research indicated there is a correlation between management size
and hotel sales price. While the framework of economies of scale was used to make assumptions
of underlying causes, qualitative research to enhance the understanding of such effects may be
useful. Feedback from all stakeholders in the agency effects section of this dissertation research
should be considered to examine the causes of management size impact, including the effects of
technology, human capital, buyers' perception, and more. An alternate and potentially appealing
methodology could be to single out hotels that have switched management groups and traded
several times to compare management size impact in a matched pair approach.
The literature also highlighted the impact of economies of scope, which in this research
would relate to management companies that manage hotels in many Chain Segments versus
those that operate only specific types of hotels. Examination of management impact on sales
price by number of Chain Segments under management may provide interesting insights that
management companies could use to optimize their operation.
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In addition, examination of the seller, buyer, and lender profiles could shed additional
insight into the sales price performance of hotels. For example, many institutional investors and
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) prefer buying hotels that require limited value-add to
ensure long-term, lease level stabilized income, hence may pay a premium and often partner with
larger management companies. This is also the case for many lenders who may require a
franchise agreement and a qualified larger management company. On the flip side, opportunistic
investors often need a discount in the basis to ‘make the deal pencil’ and partner with a smaller
management company that can execute based on their unique business plan. Additionally,
examination of owner-managed hotels versus third party managed hotels might result in findings
that may strengthen or weaken the argument of the agency effect.
Lastly, this study did not distinguish between brand-managed hotels, where the franchise
owner also provides management services, and independent third-party management companies
that may or may not adhere to a franchise agreement. Building on Dick (2018), analysis of
brand-managed sales outcomes versus non-brand-managed hotels may shed insight into hotel
sizes and locations that may perform better under either management structure.
Conclusion
On February 27th 2007, Four Seasons Hotels, Inc. issued materials to its shareholders and
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2007) of its intent to allow Prince Abdulaziz’
Kingdon Hotels and Bill Gates’ Cascade Investments to purchase a majority stake in the
company and stop trading on the public stock exchange, also known as going private. The
collaborators explained their move as:
Kingdom and Cascade believe that Four Seasons’ future business prospects can be
improved through their participation in the strategic direction of Four Seasons and their
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access to capital sources. In particular, they believe that the public equity markets do not
adequately reward investments by hotel management companies in the real estate that they
manage. (p. 23)
It is an obvious and logical statement that hotel management companies, just like managers of
other real estate asset classes have a direct operational effect, but rarely do investors recognize
the influence of on-site management on real estate asset value in their financial models. The
central premise behind this dissertation was that management companies have an impact on a
hotel sales price at the time of a transaction. Specifically, this study was built on the existing
body of knowledge in economies and diseconomies of scale to determine if a change in the size
of a management company initially has a positive relationship to the corresponding real estate
price premium, and then a decrease after reaching substantial scale, visually presenting a reverse
U-shape effect. Three main hypotheses were tested in order to answer the research question: (1)
if there is an economies of scale effect between management size and sale price; (2) if the size of
the hotel influences the impact of management; and (3) if such effect differs by location.
First, the overall effect of management size on sales price was investigated. A positive
impact of 5% was found on price for hotels managed by groups that have between 220-677
hotels under management, whereas a negative impact of 16.5% on sales price was found for
hotels managed by larger management groups. The resulting plot is a deformed reverse U-shape,
but confirmed my initial assumptions.
Second, the data were dissected next to review the management impact by hotel size. The
results indicated that smaller hotels realized a more significant impact on their sales price than
hotels with more than 218 rooms. This finding builds on available academic literature in
economies of scope, as larger hotels may have more diverse capabilities ‘in house’, hence would
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extract less value from external services offered by a management group. Therefore, this
hypothesis tested positive for mid-sized hotels.
Finally, the location of a hotel in Gateway and Non-Gateway subsample markets was
examined to determine whether it would amend the initial findings. While the effects did not
show notable changes, The Non-Gateway subsample effects resembled stronger reverse U-shape
results with higher statistical significance, thereby reconfirming the third hypothesis.
The effect of management company size on hotel class (Chain Segment) was also
examined by location, and during the great financial crisis, but did not point to notable findings.
The results suggest that hotel management has varying degrees of effect on the real asset
value of a hotel, and that hotel investors should carefully consider the selection of a management
company. This dissertation contributes to contemporary knowledge in hedonic pricing models
for hotels by adding the previously unresearched variable of management company size. The
findings also suggest that similar research may be useful in other real estate asset classes where
management companies provide support to property owners.
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
Data for this research were extracted from the following sources:
CBRE:

Coldwell Banker Richard Ellis (CBRE) is a commercial real estate services and
investment firm. They maintain a large database of hotel transactions and offer a
variety of products covering market trends, sales transactions and room inventory
pipelines, link: https://www.cbrehotels.com/en/research

RCA:

Real Capital Analytics (RCA) manages a database that is one of the largest listing of
investors, deals and trends in the real estate investment market, link:
https://www.rcanalytics.com/rca-insights/

STR:

Smith Travel Research (STR) was founded in 1985 and now operates in 16 countries.
Its products include global hotel data benchmarking, marketplace insights and
benchmarking analysis, link: https://str.com/data-insights/resources

FAA:

Federal Aviation Administration manages the database of commercial and private
airports, link: https://aisfaa.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/e747ab91a11045e8b3f8a3efd093d3b5_0?selectedAt
tribute=TYPE_CODE

Census:

2010 Census Data as reported by the Census Bureau which includes area median
incomes by zip code, link: https://github.com/Ro-Data/Ro-Census-Summaries-ByZipcode

Living Atlas: Lat/long locations for city centers, link:
https://hub.arcgis.com/datasets/6996f03a1b364dbab4008d99380370ed_0
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